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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper investigates the effect of crime on the overall economic activity over the period 1993–2012 
and attempts to (i) uncover underlying causal relationships; (ii) account for the dynamic nature of any 
such relationships; and (iii) explain the heterogeneous nature of such relationships among different 
Mexican states.   
 
Due to limitations of both data and methodology, much of the literature to date has taken a fairly 
simplified approach to the topic, in effect highlighting a negative association between rates of crime and 
overall economic activity. However, mere associations do not disentangle the effect of crime on overall 
economic activity from the reverse causal effect of overall economic activity on crime. For example, a 
negative association may arise because increased crime reduces economic activity, or because reduced 
economic activity increases crime. The policy implications can be quite different, depending on the extent 
to which either of these two causal mechanisms between crime and the economy may be present and on 
the channels through which they operate. 
 
The paper attempts to uncover the causal relationships between crime rates and overall economic activity 
upon which policy could be developed. Toward this end, it seeks to isolate the causal elements, or 
“shocks” which are responsible for driving both crime and overall economic activity. The paper 
recognizes that the responses of crime and overall economic activity need not occur at the same time as 
the shocks, but may occur gradually over time. To ignore this feature risks miscalculating the full 
magnitude and importance of the shocks. Similarly, it is important to recognize that relationships at the 
aggregate level often mask large and important but sometimes opposing effects that occur at a dis-
aggregated level. For Mexico, the fact that different states experience potentially different responses to 
local, national, or international shocks can lead to the false impression that the consequences of the 
shocks are relatively minor if one does not take this feature into account. There are substantial differences 
in the economic activities of the states of Mexico, reflecting for example the varying importance of 
manufacturing, resource extraction, agriculture and tourism, and it is natural to expect that the response to 
internal and external shocks, whether from crime or economic activity in general, will differ among the 
states. 
 
To address these points, the paper takes a more nuanced approach than is typical in the existing literature. 
It does so based on newly published econometric techniques that are being used in numerous fields of 
economics and have been employed successfully in other published IMF research. The approach uses a 
blend of economic concepts and econometric methods to identify causal effects. For example, the 
approach disentangles the source of causal shocks as originating on the supply side or the demand side of 
the economy based on whether the estimated effect of the shocks moves per capita output in the long run, 
regardless of what the shorter term dynamic consequences might be for crime. Similarly, shocks 
originating from crime independently of the economy are disentangled from supply and demand shocks 
on the basis of whether they have short term immediate effects on the crime variable. In this regard, it is 
important to note that, in its primary analysis, this paper does not study a particular category of crime 
shocks, but rather studies the response of both homicide data and economic data in response to general 
crime shocks. The longer term dynamic consequences for crime or overall economic activity are then 
examined. In this regard, the approach builds on other structural econometric methods, and further 
expands on the set of key features that can be addressed by doing so in the context of data sets that take 
the form of panel data, namely data that is observed both over time and over geographic space. In the case 
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of the paper this constitutes the 32 states of Mexico, with data on homicides, state gross domestic product, 
state foreign direct investment and state population migrations, observed annually for each state from 
1993 to 2012. The approach taken in the paper is limited in several regards. For example, the approach is 
limited due to the measurement error inherent in the data. Most importantly, interpretations are dependent 
upon the particular econometric identification scheme, which employs homicide data in part to capture 
the response of crime shocks, and is subject to assumptions that must be made on whether the class of 
relevant shocks has been captured by the set of econometric restrictions that are imposed on the data. In 
this regard, the research aims to contribute to the analysis of the relationships, but is not intended to be 
conclusive in its findings. 
 
Based on this approach, the paper finds the following results. The first set of results pertains to the 
evidence that crime has been intertwined with overall economic activity in the states of Mexico, including 
international factor flows in the form of foreign direct investment and migrations during the sample 
period. In this context, the paper isolates the relative magnitude and importance of various shocks. For 
example the study finds that crime shocks which originate at the national or international level are 
responsible for a quarter of a percent impact on national per capita GDP over time. But more importantly, 
the state level analysis is able to reveal the considerable range of responses among the various states. In 
particular, the responses are mixed, and vary both in sign and magnitude. Since individual state estimates 
are not sufficiently accurate as to be reliable with such short spans of data, the paper instead reports the 
estimated sample distribution of state responses in terms of quartiles. For example, state-specific crime 
shocks that are associated with on average an initial one fifth percent increase in homicides for the states, 
induce on average a one-half percent temporary decrease in per capita GDP, which persists for up to two 
years after the shock before eventually dissipating after the third year. However, for the quarter of the 
sample of states that experience the biggest effect, the impact is more extreme and persistent, leading to 
roughly a one-half percent decrease in per capita GDP that does not dissipate, but rather remains 
permanently reduced. The primary finding in this regard is that the response of among states is complex, 
nuanced and varied by state. 
 
The second set of results pertains to the state-specific characteristics that are associated with larger or 
smaller economic responses to crime shocks. The paper finds state-specific factors that are associated 
with mitigating the decrease in GDP per capita that follows a crime shock. For example, one such state-
specific characteristic is a measure of the importance of the construction industry as a share of the state 
economy. Those states with a bigger proportion of their economic activity devoted to construction appear 
to experience smaller magnitude impacts of crime shocks on per capita GDP. Another such state-specific 
characteristic relates to the size of the economic response, and particularly the foreign direct investment 
response to a crime shock, and is the overall sense of security on the part of public as reflected in 
household survey responses. Systematically, when the perception of a sense of security is higher, an equal 
sized crime shock appears to have a smaller consequence for the economy as a whole. This points to the 
potential importance of the perception and public confidence in the quality of institutions which provide 
for public security.   
 
The paper presents an econometric research study on the effect of crime on overall economic activity in 
Mexico at the state level, and does not advocate any specific policy responses. The sample period does 
not cover the analysis of developments in the recent period since 2012. However, more recently, Mexico 
is reported to be engaged in making efforts toward a further strengthening of its AML/CFT regime. Also, 
the recent data by INEGI have recorded a decrease in the total number of homicides in the recent period 
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since 2012. In addition, Mexico has put forward a judicial reform agenda, which is expected to be in place 
in all states by 2016. While these efforts and reforms should contribute to mitigating the impact of crime 
on overall economic activity at the state level, they remain components of a broader strategy, the effects 
of which are yet to be assessed.   
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the problem of crime has been a source of concern for international organizations, policy 
makers, and the populations in Mexico. Mexico has recently put forward an ambitious structural reform 
agenda, including initiatives that aim at improving the rule of law. In light of this, understanding the 
relationships between crime and overall economic activity is as important as ever.  
 
Despite the increase in Mexico’s crime rates over the sample period of this study (from 1993 to 2012), 
over similar periods crime has been much higher elsewhere in the Americas, as measured by homicide 
rates—one of the most commonly used indicators for comparing levels of crime (see UNODC 2014).2 As 
illustrated in Figure 1, Honduras has a homicide rate nearly four times that of Mexico, El Salvador’s rate 
is three times as high, and Venezuela’s is more than twice as high. Even Colombia has a homicide rate 
that is nearly 50 percent greater than 
Mexico’s.  
 
The incidence of crime varies widely 
across Mexican states. According to the 
Mexican National Institute of Statistics 
(INEGI), during most of the last decade, 
from 1997 to 2007, Mexico's homicide 
rate plunged from 14 homicides per 
100,000 to a much lower level of 8 per 
100,000 in 2007. However, over the next 
few years, Mexico's relatively successful 
story in decreasing homicides reversed 
itself with more than 21.5 per 100,000 
recorded in 2012. As discussed in 
numerous studies (see for example Robles et al., 2013, Mejia et al., 2012b; Guerrero, 2011a; Dell, 2012; 
Calderon et al., 2013), this remarkable surge in homicide rates is considered to be a direct result of the 
dramatic increase in violence associated with drug trafficking organizations and other organized crime 
groups. To a large extent, the growth of the drug trafficking organizations was likely in response to 
shocks taking place not only internally, but also in other latitudes: the drug demand from the U.S. market; 
the success of other governments, such as Colombia’s in regaining control of the country from crime; and 
the closing of the drug-trafficking routes in the Caribbean achieved by the U.S.  
 
                                                     
2 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), Global Study on Homicide on 2013, page 9. 
According to this source, “Moreover, as the most readily measurable, clearly defined and most 
comparable indicator for measuring violent deaths around the world, homicide is, in certain 
circumstances, both a reasonable proxy for violent crime as well as a robust indicator of levels of security 
within States.”  
Figure 1. Selected Countries: Intentional Homocide Rates (per 100,000 
inhabitants)
Source: UNODC Global Study on Homicide (2014), Heinle et al.( 2014) and authors' calculations       
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Homocide Rate in 2012
Average Homocide Rate (2007-2012)
------ Selected Countries Average Homocide 
Rate (2007-2012)
8 
 
Figure 2. Mexico: Real GDP Growth vs. Homicide Rates 1/
Source:  INEGI, CONAPO, and authors' estimates
1/ For the methodology used to estimate the Real GDP, see the technical Appendix A.
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It has long been recognized that crime has effects on the economy (for references see the literature review 
in section II below). In the short run, 
crime has the potential to inhibit the 
accumulation of part of the physical 
and human capital stock, the 
allocation of which may be further 
distorted by the infiltration of 
criminal organizations into the 
formal economic system. From a 
dynamic perspective, crime 
potentially increases the risk and 
uncertainty of the business 
environment, which in turn may 
hinder the accumulation process and 
lower the long-run growth rate of the 
economy.
3
 For example, according 
to Hallward-Driemeier and Stewart 
(2004) and Daniele and Marani 
(2011), the primary effect of 
organized crime is to increase the 
costs of doing business. Other 
adverse effects of crime include 
extortion (Brock, 1998 and Daniele 
and Marani, 2011), kidnapping of 
workers (Clegg and Gray, 2002), and disruptions in supply chains (Barnes and Oloruntoba, 2005; 
Czinkota, 2005; Globerman and Storer, 2009; and Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010). Local demand may 
decline due to emigration, business relocation, and firm closures (Greenbaum et al., 2007). Also, Ashby 
and Ramos (2013) find a negative effect of organized crime on foreign investment in Mexico. 
 
Figure 2 reflects the evolution of real GDP (RGDP) growth and homicides rates for different periods 
between 1993–2012. In particular, the last period (2007–2012) illustrates an important increase in the 
median homicide rate at the national level. It also shows that a number of states have homicide rates well 
above the national median. It is interesting to observe, however, that for some states with increases in 
homicide rates the economic growth rates are above the national median, while others fall below the 
median RGDP growth rate for the period. 
 
Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between crime and 
other economic activities in Mexico at the state level from 1993–2012, with an eye toward the broader 
potential role of crime for domestic stability as a whole.4 For example, does crime lower overall economic 
                                                     
3
 See Pinotti (2011). 
4 For IMF discussions on the effect of predicate crimes on stability, please refer to the following 
documents: AML/CFT—Report on the Review of the Effectiveness of the Program, see 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/051111.pdf, May 11, 2011, and Acting Chair’s Summing Up, 
(continued…) 
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activity in Mexico in the long run, at both the individual state and aggregate levels, and if so, by what 
mechanisms? How important are shocks at the state level versus the national and international level for 
the relationship between crime and overall economic activity? What role, if any, do international factor 
flows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and international migration play in the channel by 
which crime impacts overall economic activity at both the state and national levels? How do the dynamic 
relationships between crime, FDI, and overall economic activity differ across the states of Mexico and 
what socio-economic factors if any may account for these differences? In this regard, it is important to 
note that, in its primary analysis, this paper does not study a particular category of crime shocks, but 
rather studies the response of both homicide data and economic data in response to general crime shocks. 
 
In addressing these questions, we recognize that the relationships are potentially complex in terms of the 
dynamic interdependency between crime and economic activity, and that these dynamic 
interdependencies may differ substantially among different states. In light of this, as described in 
section III of our paper, we employ the panel SVAR methodology of Pedroni (2013), which is designed to 
accommodate these issues for panels comprised of relatively short and possibly noisy data. Furthermore, 
by using a structurally identified VAR approach, subject to our econometric identification scheme, we are 
able to study the role of shocks to crime in general, rather than on the basis of more narrowly defined 
proxies. Thus, while we use recorded homicide data as one of our endogenous variables, in the VAR 
analysis the crime shocks are defined as any crime which induces a movement in the homicide rate 
subject to the econometric identifying restrictions that we place on the other economic variables in the 
system, as we discuss in further detail in section III of the paper. 
 
On the basis of such an approach, we find that crime has played an important role in driving the variation 
in several key economic variables at the state level. For example, we find that on average state-specific 
and common national and international crime shocks together are responsible for up to 5.5 percent of the 
variation state-level GDP in the years following the shocks. We also find considerable heterogeneity 
among the states, with up to one-fourth of all states experiencing as much as 11 percent of the variation in 
their GDP to crime shocks. Furthermore, we show that the specific impulse responses are heterogeneous, 
but with up to a quarter of all states seeing on average a 1.6 percent per annum decrease in GDP for the 
first five years following a crime shock. We also find that crime shocks have a considerable, but also very 
heterogeneous relationship to FDI flows at the state level. When we study the pattern among states of the 
magnitude of the responses of GDP and FDI to crime shocks, two important characteristics stand out, 
namely the relative importance of the construction sector as a percentage of the state economy and the 
degree of a perception of public security as reflected in survey responses. On average, the prevalence of 
construction is associated with a diminished negative impact of crime on overall economic activity, while 
a sense of insecurity, as reflected in public survey data, is on average associated with an increased 
negative impact of crime on economic activity and FDI in particular. These findings are potentially 
                                                                                                                                                                           
AML/CFT—Report on the Review of the Effectiveness of the Program, 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=EBM/11/55, June 6, 2011. See also AML/CFT—
Inclusion in Surveillance and Financial Stability Assessments—Guidance Note, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/121412a.pdf, December 17, 2012.  See also a discussion of the 
IMF Member’s Commitments on stability issues in the IMF Review of the 1977 Decision on Surveillance 
over Exchange Rate Policies, Further Considerations, and Summing Up of the Board Meeting, chart 1, 
page 3. 
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important for the ongoing process of judicial reform in Mexico as well as for the continuing efforts 
toward a further strengthening of the Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT) regime in Mexico. We should note of course that our study is focused on the period from 
1993 to 2012 and therefore does not account for the reforms that have taken place in Mexico since 2012. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the empirical 
framework for examining the effect of crime on the economy. In section III, we describe our empirical 
methodology and strategy for identifying crime shocks, other key structural shocks in a panel VAR 
context, and limitations of the analysis. Section IV describes the data. The paper’s empirical results are 
presented and discussed in section V, while section VI summarizes and concludes. A technical appendix 
includes a brief description of the methodology used for constructing a sufficiently long series for real 
GDP using a single base year, which we also consider to be an important contribution in support of the 
primary objective of the paper. 
 
II.   RELATED LITERATURE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIME AND OTHER ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY  
The importance of crime in determining a country’s economic progress has long been recognized both in 
the academic literature and in policy-making circles. Some contributions have tried to establish a 
relationship theoretically between crime, growth, and development (e.g., Bourguignon, 2001; Fajnzylber 
et al., 2002; Mauro and Carmeci, 2007) and some studies quantify economic and social cost of organized 
crime for different countries (Fajnzylber et al., 2002c; Buvinic and Morrison, 1999; Glaeser, 1999; and 
International Centre for the Preventing of Crime, 1998; Londono and Guerrero, 2000; and Rios, 2011). 
Other scholars, such as Prasad (2012), try to examine the link between economic controls and black 
markets, by exploring the effects of India’s liberalization experiment on its murder rate. A number of 
studies have analyzed the transmission channels through which crime, either directly or indirectly, 
impacts economic growth (see e.g., Goulas and Zervoyianni, 2013; Detotto and Otranto, 2010; Detotto 
and Vannini, 2009; Czabanski, 2008; Brand and Price, 2000; and Anderson, 1999).  
 
Nevertheless, despite the growing literature, empirical studies have not yet produced a definitive 
conclusion regarding the impact of crime on economic growth. A way to measure the crowding-out effect 
of crime is to estimate its impact on the economic performance of a country, a region, or a municipality. 
We can distinguish two approaches. The first approach is to compare the overall macroeconomic 
performance of countries or regions with high levels of crime to that of countries with low levels of 
crime, controlling for other explanatory variables (this approach comes from Barro, 1996). For example, 
Peri (2004), using a large data set (from 1951 to 1991), shows that the annual per capita income growth is 
negatively affected by murders after controlling for other explanatory variables. Gaibulloev and Sandler 
(2008) measure the impact of domestic and transactional terrorism on income per capita growth for 1971–
2004 in a panel of 18 Western Europe countries.  
 
The second approach consists of univariate and multivariate time series methodologies. Recently, there 
have been many contributions to this approach, wherein crime is considered along with various macro 
variables. For example, Detrotto and Otranto (2010) show that crime negatively impacts economic 
performance in Italy. The findings suggest that the economic costs of crime include a significant fixed 
component, and that the dynamics of the economic cost is time-varying, but always significant. Chen 
(2009) implements a VAR model to examine the long-run and causal relationships among unemployment, 
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income, and crime in Taiwan. Narayan and Smyth (2004) implement a Granger causality tests to examine 
the relationship among seven different crime typologies, unemployment, and real wage in Australia 
within an AutoRegressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. Kumar (2013) empirically examines the 
causality between crime rates and economic growth using a reduced form equation and an instrumental 
variable based on state level data in India. Pinotti (2011) examines post-war economic growth of two 
regions in southern Italy which were exposed to the presence of mafia organizations after the 1970s, and 
applies synthetic control methods to estimate the counterfactual growth performances in the absence of 
organize crime.  
 
Other studies have quantified different economic effects of organized crime. For example, Hallward-
Driemeier and Stewart (2004) and Daniele and Marani (2011) show that the primary effect of organized 
crime is to increase the costs of doing business. The potential adverse effects are through assessment of 
regional security risks (Kotabe, 2005), security budgets (Spich and Grosse, 2005 and Czinkota et al., 
2010), extortion (Brock, 1998 and Daniele and Marani, 2011), kidnapping of workers (Clegg and Gray, 
2002), disruptions in supply chains (Barnes and Oloruntoba, 2005; Czinkota, 2005; Globerman and 
Storer, 2009; and Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010), and decreases in local demand (Greenbaum et al., 2007). 
Local demand may decline due to emigration, business relocation, and firm closures (Greenbaum et al., 
2007). Brock (1998) finds relatively higher FDI in regions of Russia where the level of crime is lower. 
Madrazo Rojas (2009) finds empirical evidence of a negative association between violent organized crime 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexican states. Daniele and Marani (2011) find support for a 
negative relationship between total regional crime and FDI in Italy. Many of these scholars, including 
Fajnzylber et al. (2000), Detotto and Otranto (2011); Forni and Paba (2000), Cardenas (2007), Ashby and 
Ramos (2013), and Robles et al. (2013), use the number of recorded intentional homicides as a crime 
indicator. 
 
Finally, for Mexico, Dell (2012) examines the direct and spillover effects of Mexican policy towards the 
drug trade, and finds that crime creates a contagion effect between those municipalities closer to drug 
trafficking routes. Ashby and Ramos (2013) find that organized crime deters foreign investment in the 
financial services, commerce, and agricultural sectors, but not the oil and mining sector, for which they 
find increased crime associated with increased investment. Robles et al. (2013) find that there is a 
threshold for crime, below which individuals and companies internalize the cost of security and protection 
in accordance with their economic capacity. Once the threshold is surpassed, companies and individuals 
will modify their investment decisions, production, labor participation, and employment, all of which 
have a negative impact on economic activity. 
 
In our paper, we use a relatively novel approach to investigate the effect of crime on economic 
performance in Mexican states in a manner that more systematically accounts for dynamic endogeneity. 
We seek to do so subject to the double challenge of employing credible identifying restrictions while 
deriving results for a large group of possibly quite heterogeneous states. Conventional dynamic panel 
methods are not appropriate in light of the fact that they require the dynamics of individual state 
responses to be identical among all the states. Instead, we employ a panel methodology that allows 
individual states’ responses to structural shocks to be heterogeneous. In particular, to address these issues 
in the context of structural identification, we use the panel SVAR methodology developed in Pedroni 
(2013). Recent examples of the use of this methodology in policy relevant empirical applications include 
among others, Pedroni and Verdugo (2011), which analyzes the effect of drug production on the formal 
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economy in Peru, and Mishra et al. (2014), which analyzes the effectiveness of monetary policy in low 
income countries. 
 
III.   ESTIMATION AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
A.   Overview of the Methodology 
As noted, the relationship between crime and economic activity is quite complex. The two can be deeply 
intertwined, such that crime has an impact on economic activity at the same time that economic activity 
has an impact on crime. Furthermore, the nature of this endogeneity is likely also to be dynamic, in the 
sense that the feedback between crime and economic activity occurs gradually over time, and with 
different intensities over different time horizons.   
 
Adding to this complexity, when we study the relationship between crime and economic activities at the 
aggregate state level in a country such as Mexico, we need to recognize that the nature of these dynamic 
relationships need not be the same in different states and may differ substantially among states. The 
differences may arise for a number of reasons. For example, the structure of the economies differs at the 
state level. Factors affecting crime differ geographically at the state level. The nature and the intensity of 
both crime and economic activity can differ across states. Finally, the mechanisms by which crime and 
economic activity interact with one another over time can differ regionally among states. 
 
Another dimension to this complexity arises from the fact that both crime and economic activity may 
respond differently to unobserved innovations in various types of economic activity and crime depending 
on whether the innovations originate locally or somewhere else. For example, changes in economic 
activity nationally or internationally, as well as changes in other factors that drive crime nationally or 
internationally can be expected to impact criminal and economic activity at the state level. This creates a 
potential further complexity in the form of a cross sectional, or spatial dependence of crime and economic 
activity among the states of Mexico. 
 
For these reasons, our empirical approach is one that accommodates potentially complex dynamic 
endogeneities that differ among states, and which are responding to potentially unobserved shocks that 
occur either at the local state level or at the national and international level. A standard econometric tool 
that accounts for dynamic endogeneities in general is the structural VAR approach. The structural VAR 
approach begins by estimating the dynamic relationship among the variables by use of a system of 
equations that represent a sufficient number of lags of each of the variables in each of the equations, so 
that what remain as residuals in the equations are disturbances that are uncorrelated over time. Next, in 
order to relate these disturbances to structural shocks that have economic meaning, one exploits economic 
identifying restrictions. However, the approach requires time series data of substantial length, beyond 
what is available for the current analysis. A natural solution is a panel approach, which treats each state as 
a member of the panel, and compensates for the lack of a substantial time series dimension by exploiting 
the fact that the dynamic relationships are observed repeatedly among members of the panel.   
 
However, in taking a panel approach, we must take care in how we treat the individual members of the 
panel. Most fundamentally, we must account for the fact that the states of Mexico differ from one another 
as reflected in potentially heterogeneous dynamic relationships between crime and other economic 
activity. Failing to account for heterogeneity in the estimation of dynamic relationships results in a well 
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known econometric problem that can lead to inconsistent estimation and inference of the relationships.5 
Consequently, we do not want to simply pool the Mexican state-level data as one would for conventional 
dynamic panel methods, which rely on the assumption of homogeneous dynamics among the members of 
the panel. Instead, the methodology we use must account for this heterogeneity directly. 
 
Rather than considering the heterogeneity as an obstacle, the method we use exploits this heterogeneity as 
an asset that can help us to uncover some of the differing mechanisms by which crime and economic 
activity interact in the states of Mexico from 1993–2012. In particular, the methodology that we use is 
based on the panel structural VAR approach developed in Pedroni (2013). Specifically, the approach 
models heterogeneous state-specific dynamic responses to unobserved shocks that occur either at the state 
level or at the national and international level. In this manner, the technique accommodates both the 
heterogeneity and the cross sectional dependence that arises from the responses to shocks that are 
common across states.6 The shocks are treated as structural and unobserved. They are identified and 
estimated via a method of structural identification analogous to the conventional structural VAR 
approach. The panel methodology then exploits the statistical relationship of the structural shocks to 
decompose them efficiently into shocks that are common to the members of the panel versus shocks that 
are idiosyncratic to individual members of the panel. The relative importance of the idiosyncratic versus 
common shocks is permitted to differ for each member of the panel, and each member is permitted to 
respond in a heterogeneous member specific manner to both the common and idiosyncratic shocks. 
 
As is typical in structural VAR approaches, the responses to the structural shocks are represented as 
impulse responses, and the importance of the shocks are represented as dynamic variance decompositions. 
In the context of our panel approach, our identification provides us with sample estimates of a set of state-
specific responses and variance decompositions to both the idiosyncratic and common structural shocks 
for each of the 32 states of Mexico. This sample distribution of state-specific responses allows us to study 
the economic conditions and characteristics of the states that are associated with particular patterns among 
the responses. For example, using the distribution of individual state responses we can investigate which 
state characteristics are associated with larger or smaller responses of economic activity to unexpected 
changes in crime. Of course, in doing so, we must take into account the fact that the responses and 
decompositions are estimated and are subject to uncertainty from the sampling variation associated with 
the estimation. Accordingly, we use a bootstrap estimator which produces confidence bands not only for 
the distribution of impulse responses and variance decompositions, but also for the subsequent analysis of 
the state characteristics associated with patterns in these distributions. For a more detailed discussion of 
the methodology, we refer readers to the discussions in Pedroni (2013) as well as the empirical 
application of the technique in Mishra et al. (2014). 
 
                                                     
5 See for example Pesaran and Smith (1995), for a discussion of this point. 
 
6
 The methodology decomposes the structural shocks into two categories which for convenience are referred to as 
“common” and “idiosyncratic.” More broadly, any shock which predominantly impacts only a single state, 
regardless of whether the geographic origin is specifically within the state or outside the state is picked up as an 
idiosyncratic shock. Similarly, a shock which predominantly impacts multiple states, regardless of the specific 
geographic origin, is picked up as a common shock. In this manner, interdependencies among states are in practice 
permitted to be more general and complex than the terms idiosyncratic and common might otherwise connote. 
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B.   Overview of the Identification Strategy 
Next, we discuss the identification strategy associated with our panel methodology. While we employ the 
identification scheme and corresponding methodology to the case of the states of Mexico, in principle, the 
same can be applied to any of a number of countries facing crime. In this regard, as a structural VAR-
based method, a key feature involves the identification of the unobserved structural shocks to which the 
observed state level data is responding. Proper identification ensures that the impulse responses and 
variance decompositions can be given economic causal interpretations that account for the interdependent 
endogenous dynamics. It is also an essential element of our panel methodology in that with relatively 
short lengths of data it will allow us to efficiently decompose the structural shocks into identified 
common and idiosyncratic components. 
 
A key strategy for successful identification is to consider the variables of interest in relationship to the 
shocks that drive them. In our case, we are primarily interested in the responses of crime and overall 
economic activity, as represented by GDP. However, we are also interested in studying the role that key 
international factor movements, such as capital flows in the form of FDI and labor flows in the form of 
migration, play in the relationship between crime and economic activity. For each of these variables, we 
will investigate the responses to the key structural shocks that potentially impact the economy. Among 
these, we have classified shocks into four broad categories. The first two we view as shocks to economic 
activity. In the regional and macroeconomic literatures, these are often loosely referred to as aggregate 
supply (AS) and aggregate demand shocks (AD). They are distinguished from one another on the basis of 
whether they correspond to shocks that permanently increase or decrease total economic activity (AS) 
versus shocks that have only a transitory effect on total economic activity (AD).  
 
The next two shocks we view as perturbations in crime and migration that originate independently of 
other economic activity. The crime shocks can be thought of as shocks to either the supply or demand for 
criminal activity for a given level of economic activity,7 and similarly the migration shocks can be 
conceptualized as shocks to either the supply or demand for net migration for a given level of economic 
activity. As we discuss in the next section on data sources, our GDP variable is measured as log per capita 
state GDP, our FDI variable is measured as log per capita cumulative FDI state inflows, our crime 
variable is measured as log per capita state homicides and our migration variable is measured as log per 
capita international net migration into the state. Each of the four categories of shocks is permitted to affect 
                                                     
7 Changes in the demand for crime can be anything that creates a demand for the services that are provided by 
criminal activity, such as changes in the demand for illicit drugs, whether locally or nationally and internationally, 
for a given level of economic activity. One such simple example could be when U.S. households change their 
demand for illicit drugs and hence for the services provided by criminal activity. Changes in the supply of crime can 
be viewed as anything that induces individuals to become more or less willing to engage in criminal activity, 
whether locally, nationally or internationally for a given level of economic activity. One such simple example could 
be a change in legislation or the degree of enforcement related to crimes. However, since we capture both concepts 
in our crime shock, the distinction between supply and demand is not essential for our empirical analysis. In effect, 
our crime shock is a shock to equilibrium levels of crime, regardless of whether the equilibrium has moved in 
response to a change in the supply or a change in the demand for crime.  In this regard, it should be noted that crime 
shocks are not synonymous with homicide shocks, but rather encompass all forms of crime that have the potential to 
move the homicide rate, including, but not limited to violent crime, organized crime, crimes to health, and so forth, 
which are discussed in section IV.  
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each of the four variables over time. Thus, in our setup, GDP responds to crime and migration shocks as 
well as economic activity shocks, and homicides respond to crime and migration shocks as well as 
economic activity shocks, and so forth. 
 
However, the shocks are neither directly observed nor proxied. Rather, as in the structural VAR literature 
in general, we infer the shocks based on the pattern of responses among the observed variables. Doing so 
requires us to place a few minimal restrictions on the timing of the permissible responses of the variables 
to the shocks. These are known in the structural VAR literature as the identifying restrictions. The most 
commonly used identifying restrictions come in the form of exclusion restrictions on either the immediate 
impact effect of some of the shocks on some of the variables, or on the very long-run steady-state effect 
of some of the shocks on some of the variables. The former are loosely referred to as “short-run” 
restrictions while the latter are loosely referred to as “long-run” restrictions. As best as possible, these 
restrictions should be motivated on the basis of sound a priori economic reasoning. All of the transition 
dynamics between the initial impact and the eventual long-run steady state time horizon are then typically 
left completely unrestricted, and are permitted to be fully endogenous in terms of the feedback among the 
variables. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, we use a mix of both short-run and long-run identifying restrictions and 
build on some of the typical restrictions that have been used periodically in the structural VAR literature. 
For example, to distinguish between AS shocks and AD shocks, we use the restriction that AD shocks do 
not cause permanent movements in GDP, while AS shocks do. This is in keeping with the literature and is 
consistent with their conceptual definitions. Similarly, to distinguish these two economic activity shocks 
from the crime shocks, we employ a restriction that reflects the idea that while both the crime and 
economic activity shocks can have an immediate impact effect on economic activity, only the crime 
shocks have an immediate impact on homicides. This is consistent with the idea that crime shocks 
potentially can induce rapid changes to the economy while homicides respond more slowly to changes in 
economic conditions with a lag, following the initial period of the shock. In similar spirit, we distinguish 
migration shocks via a similar short-run restriction, namely that migration can respond quickly to crime 
shocks, while homicides change more slowly in response to migration shocks. Notice that in this manner, 
the response of the economy in the form of GDP, net migration, and FDI responses to crime shocks, is 
left unrestricted. 
 
It is also worth noting that, as with any structural VAR identification scheme, short-run and long-run 
exclusion restrictions as we have described only identify the shocks up to a sign, meaning that our 
restrictions are sufficient to distinguish the four shocks from one another, but are not sufficient to 
determine whether the particular shocks were positive or negative shocks, for which we need additional 
restrictions. Consequently, we identify the signs of the shock as follows. A crime shock is identified as a 
positive shock if it increases homicides in the impact period, and a migration shock is identified as a 
positive shock if it increases net international in-migration in the impact period. Similarly an aggregate 
supply shock is identified as a positive shock if it permanently increases GDP in the long-run steady state 
time horizon. Finally, an aggregate demand shock is identified as a positive shock if it increases GDP in 
the short-run impact period. Each of these identifies the sign in a manner that is consistent with the 
economic conceptualization of the shock.   
 
As with all structural VAR analysis, since the shocks are conceptual and are not directly observed, they 
are unit free shocks. To associate economic units with the shocks, one must therefore look to the response 
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variables. Furthermore, one can use any of the response variables for this purpose. Thus, for example, one 
can study the effect on GDP of a crime shock that leads to an “x” percent increase in homicides. Or 
alternatively, one can study the effect on GDP of a crime shock that has a “y” percent increase in 
migration rates, and so forth.  As is conventional in structural VAR analysis, we report impulse responses 
to the structural shocks symmetrically without associating units and allow the reader to choose any of the 
response variables as a means for scaling the shocks to an economic unit. 
 
Since each of the variables is related to each of the four shocks, identification schemes are often depicted 
in matrix form. Thus, schematically, our set-up can be characterized as follows: where we have used a 0 
to denote a zero restriction for the particular entry, we have used a + to indicate a sign restriction, such 
that while the value of the response is unrestricted, the sign of the response is dictated by our definitions 
of what constitute positive versus negative shocks. Finally, a * is used to denote a completely unrestricted 
value for the particular entry. (See Figure 3) 
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Thus, as we see from the schematic representation, our VAR system includes a total of six exclusion 
restrictions on either the short-run impact or long-run steady state responses, and a total of four sign 
restrictions. Along with the standard assumption that the structural shocks are orthogonal, this is sufficient 
to exactly identify the VAR system of shocks and impulse responses, with all of the dynamic transition 
responses completely unrestricted. For the panel framework, we allow a similar set of restrictions to apply to 
both the response of the variables to the idiosyncratic state-specific shocks as well as the common national 
or international shocks, so that for each structural shock we have both a common and idiosyncratic 
component for a total of eight structural shocks. For each structural shock, we then obtain impulse responses 
for each of the four variables for a total of 32 impulse responses for each of the 32 states of Mexico. As 
discussed in the previous subsection, once we have the collection of impulse responses for each state, in the 
next stage we use a bootstrapped estimator to investigate state-specific characteristics associated with the 
heterogeneous patterns of responses. 
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In the conventional structural VAR literature, it is well known that results can be sensitive to the choice of 
identifying restrictions, and it is no different for panels. Accordingly, in our analysis, we confirm that our 
key findings are robust to viable variations in the identification scheme. In this regard, an additional 
attractive feature of this identification scheme is that various blocks of the system can be also investigated 
separately to confirm robustness of some of the key underlying results. For example, if we are only 
interested in the relationship between per capita crimes and economic activity in general, we can examine a 
bivariate structural VAR which includes only log per capita homicides and log per capita GDP with similar 
identifying restrictions to confirm that the key patterns hold in the subsystem. We elaborate on this further in 
the results section of our paper. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting a few important limitations. For example, the approach is naturally limited due to 
the measurement error inherent in the data, which we further discuss in the next section. Furthermore, as 
with any structural VAR analysis, interpretations are dependent upon the particular econometric 
identification scheme, which employs homicide data in part to capture the response of crime shocks, and is 
subject to assumptions that must be made on whether the class of relevant shocks has been captured by the 
set of econometric restrictions that are imposed on the data. In this regard, the research aims to contribute to 
the analysis of the relationships, but is not intended to be conclusive in its findings. 
 
Before proceeding to our results, next we discuss the details of the various data sources for Mexico. 
 
IV.   DATA SOURCES 
A.   Real GDP for the Period During 1993 to 2012 
A key challenge in implementing our panel VAR is to estimate a sufficiently long series of RGDP for each 
of the Mexican states. INEGI has only recently published the RGDP aggregated data for 2003–2012 using 
base year 2008, but to date has not yet released the GDP aggregated data from 1993 to 2003 using the base 
year 2008.   
 
There are a number of approaches to obtain real GDP values for multiple base years, among them, the 
annual chain-linked approaches.
8
 In this paper, we present two different approaches. In the first approach 
(RGDP-1), we link two aggregated RGDP series for each state: (i) the first series contains aggregated RGDP 
data from 1993 to 2003 with base year 1993, and (ii) the second series contains aggregated RGDP data from 
2003 to 2012 with base year 2008. For year 2003, for each state, we simply compute the ratio between the 
aggregate RGDP with base 2008 and the aggregate RGDP with base 1993, and then multiply the aggregated 
RGDP series with base 1993 by this ratio to obtain RGDP series for 1993–2002 with base 2008. However, 
this method does not account for the heterogeneous ratios among all RGDP sectors. In order to fix this, in 
                                                     
8
 For the purpose of this paper, we have followed recommendations provided Mc Lennan (1998), Introduction of Chain 
Volume Measures in the Australian National Accounts. Australian Bureau of Statistics. See also, Correa et al.(2002), 
and United Nations Statistics Division, Review of Country Practices on Rebasing and Linking National Accounts 
Series. 
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the second approach (RGDP-2), we apply the above method to calculate the ratio for each GDP sector to 
estimate the sector values with base 2008 for years 1993–2002. Then we sum up these sector values to 
obtain the aggregated RGDP estimates with base 2008 for years 1993–2002. 
 
The methodological description of these two different approaches is included in the Technical Appendix 1. 
We also discuss each of the various robustness checks undertaken. In Figure 9, we compare each of the 
Mexican RGDP estimates using different approaches. For cases in which we use sectoral GDP estimates for 
the purposes of our second stage analysis (see section V), we restrict our attention to 2003–2012.  
 
B.   Measures of Crime 
Intentional Homicides 
 
The second important task in implementing our panel VAR is the choice of a crime variable which is 
measured relatively well and which is likely to move in response to general crime shocks as we define them 
in our econometric identification scheme described in section II. Toward this end, and also following 
numerous other scholars (Fajnzylber et al., 2000; Detotto and Otranto, 2011; Forni and Paba, 2000; 
Cardenas, 2007; and Robles et al., 2003), the number of recorded intentional homicides are used here as the 
crime variable. The homicide rates are chosen for their highest reliability among all crime variables.9 
Homicide data are of special interest because these crimes are usually thought to be the least affected by the 
problems of under-reporting and under-recording that afflict official crime statistics (Fajnzylber, 2000). 
Even for the United States, experts have frequently focused on homicides as a proxy for crime, not only 
because “it is a fairly reliable barometer of all violent crime ,” but also because “at a national level, no other 
crime is measured as accurately and precisely.” (Fajnzylber, 2000; and Fox and Zawitz, 2000). However, as 
Heinle et al. (2014) point out, what is of particular concern regarding Mexico’s sudden increases in 
homicides in recent years (2007–2012) is that much or most of this could be attributable to organized crime 
groups. Although drug-related homicides are widely used to describe Mexico’s security challenges from 
2007 to 2012, there is no formal definition of this concept in Mexican criminal law. 10 Finally, it is important 
to note that it is not possible to distinguish between the homicides that are a result of criminal activity, much 
less any particular category of criminal activity such as organized crime, and those deaths that are the 
product of social conflict, demographic phenomena and so forth. 
 
Official data on homicides in Mexico are available from two sources. Also, a number of non-governmental 
sources have collected estimates of the number of homicides that are specifically related to the drug 
trafficking in Mexico. On the official side, public health records filed by coroner’s offices can be used to 
                                                     
9
 There are caveats to the homicides data that are worth considering, since this could reduce the reliability of the 
results. In Mexico, the phenomenon of intentional homicide presents features regarding its recording, since occurrences 
that are initially considered intentional homicides, are later determined to be of a different nature: suicide, accident due 
to fall, suspicious death, natural death, etc. This is a source of measurement error which could have implications for the 
results. 
10
 As noted by one of our commentors, another variable that could closely track the reality of crime rates affecting the 
perception of public security could be vehicle theft. 
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identify cases where the cause of death was unnatural, such as cases of gunshots wounds, stabbings, etc. 
While all the datasets have limitations, the most consistent, complete, and reliable source of information in 
Mexico is the autonomous government statistics agency, INEGI, which provides data on death by homicide 
(Heinle et al., 2014). We compile a data set of these INEGI data for 32 Mexican states during the period 
1993 through 2012.  
 
A second source of data on homicide comes from criminal investigations by law enforcement to establish a 
formal determination of criminal wrongdoing, and the subsequent conviction and sentencing of suspect 
charged with these crimes. The Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security (SESNSP) 
compiles and reports data on cases involving homicide that are identified by law enforcement. In recent 
years, SESNSP has its homicide data on a monthly basis.11  
 
As we can observe in Figure 4,12 there is a noticeable difference between public health and law enforcement 
homicide statistics, which appears to be attributable to the different timing and methodologies by which 
cases are classified. Still, data from the two sources (INEGI and SESNSP) are closely correlated and offer 
fairly consistent measures of the trends in overall homicide. Neither of the two official sources on homicide 
statistics identifies whether there is a connection to organized crime in a particular case. However, both 
government and independent sources have attempted to do so by examining other variables associated with 
a given crime.13 
 
Some statistics on organized crime related homicides are available from SESNSP for a few years from 
2006–2013. These are only comparable to some nonofficial organizations estimates from Mexico’s National 
Human Rights Commission (CNDH) for 2000–2008.14 
                                                     
11
 For a discussion on data and analysis of drug violence in Mexico, see Heinle, Ferreira and Shirk (2014). 
12
 In the figures, the homicide rate           is computed as the reported number of intentional homicides (INEGI) by 
state and year and divided by population          and multiplied by 100,000. Population refers to each state population 
at a half of every year.            
              
        
         (1) 
13
 The statistics on homicides generated by INEGI and the databases by SESNSP report two completely different 
measures. INEGI compiles its statistics through the counting of death certificates, while SESNSP does the compilation 
based on complaints or reports of probable crimes of homicides done at las procuradurías o fiscalías estatales.   
14
 For analytical and methodological concerns about this data, see Heinle et al. (2014). 
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Other Measures 
 
As discussed in the previous section, once we have the collection of impulse responses for each state, in the 
next stage we use a bootstrapped estimator to investigate state-specific characteristics associated with the 
heterogeneous patterns of responses. Among those state-specific characteristics, we are particularly 
interested in exploiting all the incidence of crime data from the SESNSP database, in particular, the 
incidence of crime related to crimes against health and the federal law against organized crime (LFCDO), 
kidnapping, extortion, aggravated assault, and robbery.15 In Mexico, one of the possible classifications of 
crimes corresponds to their jurisdictional nature. Following this logic, crimes can be catalogued as local 
crimes (fuero comun) or federal crimes (fuero federal).16 This classification will indicate the authority 
responsible for their investigation and prosecution. Fuero comun crimes are those affecting individuals 
directly. Examples of such crimes are assault, robbery, threats, sexual crimes, frauds, homicides, extortion, 
kidnapping, among others.17 On the contrary, fuero federal crimes are characterized as the ones affecting 
health, the economy and the national security or interests of the federation. These include drug trafficking, 
organized crime, environmental crimes, firearm crimes, crimes committed by public servants, money 
laundering, people and child smuggling, and electoral crimes, among others.18 19 The SESNSP reports crime 
                                                     
15
 According to Robles et al. 2013, the drug war lead to a general increase of extortion, kidnapping, and other common 
criminality. 
16
 For a detailed explanation of the official classification of federal and local crimes, please see 
http://www.pgr.gob.mx/Combate%20a%20la%20Delincuencia/Ministerio_Publico.asp. 
17
 These crimes are investigated by the State’s Prosecutors (Ministerio Publico del Fuero Comun) and prosecuted by 
the judicial branches of each state of the Mexican Republic. 
18
 Additionally, federal crimes will also include those stipulated in Article 50 of the Organic Law of the Federal 
Judicial Branch and Articles 2–5 of the Federal Criminal Code. The former provisions qualify crimes as of federal 
jurisdiction when they, among other circumstances, are typified in federal special laws; are perpetrated abroad by 
diplomatic personnel; are committed in embassies or against federal public servants. Federal crimes are investigated 
and prosecuted by federal authorities: Mexican Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR), 
Federal Prosecutor (Ministerio Público Federal, MPF), and the Federal Judicial Branch. 
Figure 4. Mexico: Comparative Homicide Rates from Different Sources
Source: INEGI, SESNSP, CNDH, CONAPO, Heinle et al. (2014), and authors' calculations.
0
5
10
15
20
25
INEGI
SESNSP
CNDH (Organized Crime Related Homicides)
SESNSP (Organized Crime Related 
Homicides)
21 
 
 
 
incidence information from initiated investigations by authorities, using data from the Institutional System 
of Statistical Information (Sistema Institucional de Información Estadística, SIIE). Since the crime incidence 
data refers to crimes of the federal and local jurisdiction, the information allows drawing conclusions on the 
macro and micro criminal situation in each state of the Mexico and at the national level. The conducts 
contemplated in the analysis by SESNSP refer to federal jurisdiction crimes which are typified in the 
Federal Criminal Code and Federal Special 
Laws. It has been mentioned that the reported 
data apparently refer to initiated investigations 
by MPF. Therefore, this likely would not give an 
accurate picture of the criminal scenario in 
Mexico, since data relating to the result of 
subsequent first and second judicial instances, 
and amparo procedures, are not reported.20  
 
With regard to fuero federal, of particular 
interest is the incidence of crime related to 
crimes against health (i.e., drugs) and organized 
crime due to the economic activity associated 
with these types of crime. The top part of the 
Figure 5 shows the scatter plot of annual totals 
intentional homicides and incidence of federal 
crimes related to drug-related issues (production, 
traffic, etc) and organized crime from 2007 
through 2012. However, there are some states in 
which the homicide rate is increasing, but the 
incidence of crime is decreasing. The latter 
could be related to two types of underreporting: (i) crimes are unobserved by the victim or authorities, 
(ii) crimes are known, but not reported. (See Shirk and Rios Cazares, 2007). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
19
 PGR is a Mexican institution of the Executive Branch. Among other functions, PGR is in charge of the investigation 
of federal crimes and of assigning jurisdictional criminal procedures among the federal criminal tribunals. The 
Attorney General presides over the PGR, the Federal Prosecutor, and its auxiliary organs, such as the investigative 
police and the experts. The MPF is society’s representative and has the exclusive monopoly of criminal action, in the 
name of the Mexican State. MPF is the specific organ in charge of the investigation (averiguación previa) of federal 
crimes and may or may not charge individuals (ejercer acción penal) at criminal tribunals, depending on the outcomes 
of the preliminary investigation. MPF can only initiate a crime investigation if it gets notice of such investigations via 
complaint (denuncia), grievance (querella), or accusation (acusación).    
 
20
 Another aspect that complicates the analysis is the broadness of two of the most relevant categories in the criminal 
incidence data referred as “other crimes” and crimes contemplated “under other special laws.” Omission by PGR to 
specify and individually address the typified conducts does not permit identification of the weight of crimes such as 
concealment and operations involving resources from illicit operations (money laundering), terrorism, pornography, 
sexual tourism, kidnapping, human trafficking, among others, which seem to be covered under these broad categories.    
Figure 5. Mexico: Homicide Rates vs. Incidence of Crime
Source: INEGI, SESNSP, CONAPO, and authors' calculations
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From the fuero comun perspective, we are interested in two crimes that generate violence: robbery and 
assault.21 The bottom part of the Figure 5 shows the scatter plot of annual totals intentional homicides vs. 
incidence of local fora crimes related to assault and robbery.22 
 
C.   Migration 
We are also interested in the role that migration plays in the relationship between crime and economic 
activity. The Consejo Nacional de Poblacion (CONAPO) releases the demographic data at the state level 
from 1990 to 2010. It also forecasts the demographic data for 2011–2030. These data include the population, 
immigration, and emigration between Mexican states; immigration from and emigration to foreign 
countries; natural and social birth and death rates; life expectation; etc. 
 
D.   Foreign Direct Investment  
As discussed in Section III, we are factoring in the role that FDI plays in the relationship with crime and 
economic activity. Mexico’s Secretary of Economy releases nominal FDI at the state level by sectors, 
origins, and investment types. The currency is in U.S. dollars. There are three investment types: new 
investments, reinvestment of profits, and intercompany accounts. Over 140 countries and economies are 
listed as the FDI origins. The U.S. consumer price index is used to deflate the nominal FDI to generate the 
real FDI. 
 
E.   State-Specific Characteristics 
For the analysis of the stated characteristics associated with patterns in the distributions of crime, GDP, FDI, 
and migration, we use the following list of variables: 
 
Average schooling years: A large body of evidence suggests that education and labor market opportunities 
influence criminal activity. Someone with a poor education and bleak labor market opportunities is more 
likely to commit a crime. According to Lochner and Moretti (2004), schooling significantly reduces criminal 
activity. In order to understand whether average schooling years matters for the Mexican states’ GDP, FDI, 
and migration responses to crime, we use the INEGI’s Statistical Yearbook By State, which compiles 
average schooling for adults from 2003-2012. 
 
Unemployment rates: Although time series have failed to uncover a robust, positive, and significant relation 
between unemployment and crime (Fleisher, 1966; and Erlich, 1973), most studies based on cross-sectional 
and individual data point in that direction (Freeman, 1986). In order to understand whether the 
unemployment explains the Mexican states’ responses of GDP, FDI, and migration to crime, we use 
unemployment rates data compiled by INEGI based on the National Survey on occupation and employment 
(ENOE) from 2003 to 2012. 
                                                     
21
 Violent crime consists of aggravated assault, rape and robbery, but excludes homicides. See Mexico Peace Index 
Methodology. 
22 Federal and local fora incidence of crime rates are calculated as         
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Bank Deposits: As discussed in International Monetary Fund (2001), criminal organizations and individuals 
sometimes rely on the legitimate banking system to hide illegally obtained assets. Financial institutions can 
be used as an instrumentality to keep or transfer the proceeds of a crime (IMF 2001). Although the 
circumstances vary from state to state in Mexico, sometimes where the criminal profits are laundered may 
be a different location from where the predicate crime was committed. To understand whether the size of 
banking assets explain the Mexican states’ GDP response to crime, we use the deposit data from the 
National Banking and Securities Commission of Mexico (CNBS) during 2000 through 2010. The data 
include the amount of deposits for immediate repayment purpose or investment purpose. 
 
Marginalization indices: There is strong evidence that social exclusion renders individuals vulnerable to 
criminal behavior (Hale, 2005). We use CONAPO data on marginalization indices for each five-year period 
since 1990. The indices are based on: (i) literacy rates; (ii) percentage in dwellings without drainage or 
toilet; (iii) percentage of households without power or without piped water or some level of overcrowding in 
houses; and (iv) percentage of population with income up to two minimum wages.  
 
Perception of Lack of Public Security:23 Periodic victimization surveys are the best tool that policy makers 
have for both detecting early trends and identifying the groups that are most at risk (Fajnzylber et al., 2000). 
INEGI published the household survey data on the perception of the lack of public security in ENSI (2005 
and 2009), and Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) 
(2010, 2011, and 2012). One common question in these surveys is “Do you think that living in your state is 
secure, insecure, or no response?” We use the percentage of the “secure” responses to measure the 
perception of public security in the state. 
 
Government spending on security: Conventional wisdom focuses on the direct effect of greater policing in 
reducing the probability of a successful crime. Becker (1968) assumes that private and public preventive 
measures are substitutes and that if the state spends substantially on crime prevention, individuals need to 
spend less to achieve a given rate of arrest. For example, Lin (2009) suggests that a police force reduces 
crime. We take this into consideration and employ a measure of the government sending on security in the 
analysis of characteristics associated with patterns in the distribution of our main variables. Mora (2009) 
lists the public spending on security at the state level for years 2007, 2008, and 2009. The expenditure 
includes situational prevention, law enforcement, social reintegration, judiciary, ombudsman, and 
contributions to the Fund for Public Safety (FASP). 
 
Informality: Yishay and Pearlman (2011) find a potential ambiguous response of formalization to robbery 
risks in Mexico, based on the dual potential effects of formality on raising the targeting of firms by 
criminals and improving protection by and recourse to official authorities. Despite this, we consider a 
                                                     
23
 However, we note that “perception of insecurity” could have a tendency to be overreported (Levit 1998). In addition, 
regarding the perception of public security, the document takes the ENVIPE data, which was first launched in 2010 and 
has been modified. For this reason one must use caution when using the data retroactively. 
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measure of informality in the analysis of characteristics associated with patterns in the distributions of 
crime, GDP, FDI, and migration. The informality is reported by the ENOE.
24
 
 
Disaggregated GDP: the disaggregated GDP includes the following sectors: agriculture, livestock and 
forestry fishing and hunting; electricity, gas and water supply for final consumer products; construction; 
manufacturing industries; commerce, transport, postal and storage; mass media information; financial 
services and insurance; real estate services; professional services, scientific and technical; corporate 
management companies; support services business and waste management and remediation services; 
education services; health and welfare services; leisure services, cultural and sports, and other recreational; 
temporary housing services and preparation of good and beverages, other services; and government 
activities and international organizations. For a detailed description of disaggregated GDP sector see Table 2 
in the appendix and INEGI (2013a). 
 
The disaggregated FDI:25 the disaggregated GDP includes the following sectors; agriculture, livestock and 
forestry fishing and hunting; electricity, gas and water supply for final consumer products; construction; 
manufacturing industries; wholesale; retail trade; transport, postal and storage; mass media information; 
financial services and insurance; real estate services; professional services, scientific and technical; 
corporate management companies; support services business and waste management and remediation 
services; education services; health and welfare services; leisure services, cultural and sports, and other 
recreational; temporary housing services and preparation of good and beverages, other government 
activities. For a detailed description of disaggregated FDI sectors see the reference Secretaría de Economía 
(2014)  
 
In Table 3 of the appendix, we summarize the list of variables used in this paper as well as the data sources. 
 
V.   RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we summarize some of the key findings of the empirical analysis. Since we are interested in 
both the short-run and long-run dynamic responses of our variables and use a combination of short-run and 
long-run identifying restrictions, one of the first empirical features of the data that we examine is the 
stationary properties. If variables are stationary, it implies that in response to any shock, over time they will 
revert back to their mean values. Consequently, for a variable that is stationary, no shock can cause a 
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 Informality is measured as an occupation rate in the informal sector. 
25
 It is important to note that FDI statistics are recorded in the home of the company’s headquarters, which may differ 
from the state in which the investment was actually made. To the extent that the company’s headquarters are not in the 
same state in which the change in FDI actually occurred, it implies that these FDI movements are somewhat more 
likely to be registered by our econometric method as having been caused not by state specific shocks, but by common 
shocks, external to the state in which the shock occurred. This may cause some of the magnitudes of the responses to 
common shocks to be upwardly biased at the expense of some of the state specific shocks. Futhermore, the state-
specific pattern of FDI responses must be interpreted with some caution in light of this. For example, the magnitude of 
the FDI responses to crime shocks, whether positive or negative, may be upwardly biased for states where companies 
tend to be headquartered. 
25 
 
 
 
permanent change. Only transitory changes are possible. By contrast, for variables that are nonstationary 
due to the presence of a unit root, at least some shock must be present that can cause a long-run permanent 
change in the variable. This carries important practical implications for our analysis. Firstly, there can be no 
lasting long-run change in a stationary variable; and secondly, a stationary variable does not contain 
information about shocks that may be responsible for causing a lasting long-run change in a nonstationary 
variable that follows a unit root process. Consequently, for the first stage of our analysis, we investigate the 
stationary properties of the data. 
 
In particular, we use standard panel unit root tests such as the one developed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(2003) to test our data.26 Not surprisingly, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that log per capita GDP 
follows a unit root for each of the states of Mexico, and that this holds regardless of which method we use to 
link the two GDP periods before and after 2003. Given that the tests have high power, this implies that GDP 
likely follows a unit root process at the state level, and therefore it is possible for some shocks in our VAR 
analysis to permanently lower or raise state level GDP.   
 
By contrast, for the crime data, only per capita homicides, as measured by INEGI were similarly found to 
follow a unit root process at the state level. By contrast, other crime measures, such as the SESNSP data on 
homicides, violent crimes, organized crime, or crimes against health appear to be stationary in the sense that 
the null hypothesis of a unit root in all states is rejected in favor of stationarity. This implies that these other 
series revert to their respective means in response to any changes, and therefore any shocks in a VAR 
system can have only transitory effects on these. Similarly, shocks that drive these data cannot have long -
term effects on variables that follow unit root process, such as GDP. If there are long-term causal effects 
present between crime and economic activity measured by GDP, they are likely to be reflected in the INEGI 
homicide data, and not these other measures. For these reasons, as well as the reasons discussed in the 
previous section, we use the INEGI homicide data as our primary crime measure in our identified structural 
VAR estimation. However, this is not to say that the information contained in these other measures might 
not interact to play a role in influencing the nature of the dynamic responses of GDP and INEGI recorded 
homicides at the state level, and therefore we employ these other variables in our second stage analysis to 
investigate the pattern of heterogeneous responses among the states. 
 
Next, for our migration data, we find that most of the measures for internal migration are stationary. By 
contrast, per capita international net in-migration appears to follow a unit root at the state level, so that it is 
possible that it contains information regarding shocks that can cause permanent changes in the INEGI 
homicides data. Since our other variables are measured in logs, we similarly convert our migration data to 
log form. To address the fact that our migration data is net in-migration, and therefore can take on positive 
or negative values, we use a fairly standard approach to convert such series to logs. Specifically, we take the 
largest negative value and this value plus 1.0 to all values of per capita net in-migration, so that upon taking 
natural logs all values are positive. Adding a constant to the series in this fashion affects the value of the 
fixed effect intercepts in a VAR estimation, but does not affect the dynamic impulse response or variance 
decomposition estimates, which are the objects of interest. Similar to the crime data, we use some of the 
                                                     
26
 We tested both the raw data as well as the transformed data from which common time effects were extracted as used 
in the panel VAR estimation. Tables for test results are available upon request. 
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other stationary migration data for our second stage analysis to investigate whether they contain information 
which helps to explain the pattern of heterogeneous responses among states. 
 
As the fourth variable in our VAR system, FDI is relatively unrestricted econometrically. Since we find that 
the flow variable for FDI is stationary, and we are interested in the relationship to the stock, we use 
accumulated net FDI for the purposes of our analysis. Since this variable is also measured as a net inflow, 
we use a similar method as we did for international per capita net in-migration to compute the log of per 
capita accumulated FDI. 
 
Consequently, as alluded to in section III, the four state-level variables that we use in our most general VAR 
specification are log per capita INEGI recorded homicides, log per capita international net in-migration, log 
per capita GDP, and log per capita accumulated net FDI. The four categories of structural shocks are crime 
shocks, migration shocks, AS shocks, and AD shocks. For a more detailed motivation for these shocks and 
for a discussion of the structural identifying restrictions used to distinguish these shocks, please see 
section III. 
 
One of the first things that we consider is the relative importance of the various shocks in driving the 
variations in the observed variables. This is reflected in the variance decompositions, which are depicted in 
Figure 11. Not surprisingly, the primary shock driving variations in homicides are the crime shocks, and the 
primary shocks driving variations in GDP are economic AS shocks. For example, the median percentage of 
GDP variation explained by state level aggregate supply shocks is roughly 70 percent. What is of note is that 
the median percentage of variation in state GDP driven by state-specific crime shocks is roughly five 
percent with another half a percent driven by common national or international crime shocks. If we consider 
the seventy-fifth percentile, this rises to as much as 10 percent due to state-specific crime shocks and 
another one percent due to national or international crime shocks. In other words, this tells us that for at least 
a quarter of the Mexican states, crime shocks are responsible for driving up to 11 percent of the variation in 
state GDP. To put this in perspective, according to Figure 11 these values are roughly comparable to the 
percentage variation in state GDP that is attributable to economic aggregate demand shocks, which would 
include private sector changes in demand for resources, as well as changes in government spending that 
stimulate the economy. Similarly, we see that crime shocks play a substantial role in driving the variation in 
both migration and FDI. In the case of migration, for at least a fourth of states, state-specific crime shocks 
initially account for 10 percent of the variation in the initial period of the shock, rising to close to 20 percent 
five years after the shock. For FDI, the median state variation explained by crime shocks is not much, at 
roughly one percent. However, for the states most affected, which lie in the top quartile, up to eight percent 
of the variation is driven by crime shocks in the initial period of the shock, rising to as much as 15 percent 
by five years after the shock. 
 
Similarly, one can examine which shocks beyond the crime shocks are most important for driving homicide 
rates. Here again, we see a large spread among the states. Whereas the variation in crime in some state, in 
other words those in the lowest quantile, attributable to other shocks is relatively low, in a few states, the 
contribution of is substantial. For example, in the top quartile states, over 10 percent in the variation in 
crime can be attributed to state-specific migration shocks, with a little over three percent each to state-
specific AS shocks and AD shocks at the longer time horizons following the shocks. 
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Of course, while these variance decompositions point to the relative importance of the various shocks in 
explaining variations in the observed variables, they tell us nothing about the signs, magnitudes, or duration 
of the responses to these shocks. For this, we turn to the impulse response analysis. The quantile impulse 
response estimates for our general four variable VAR are reported in Figure10 for both the idiosyncratic and 
common shocks. However, before exploring these, it is worth delving a bit deeper into some basic 
robustness checks to confirm that our results are not specialized to some of the choices that we have made 
regarding the variables and the identification scheme. Toward this end, we investigated multiple variations 
in the identification and multiple variations in the data choices to confirm that results were similar. For 
example, as discussed in the previous section, we examined five different methods for chaining together the 
state-level GDP estimates into a single base year from 1993 to 2012. We explored our panel VAR 
estimation for all of these different methods and found that the key results were qualitatively invariant to the 
choice of method for chaining the GDP segments. As described in section III, a nice feature of our 
identification scheme is that it also permits us to examine subsystems of the general VAR, based on two and 
three variable blocks, to confirm that our primary results also hold for these specifications. 
 
To see an example of this analysis, in Figure 6, we report one of the key sets of impulse responses, namely 
the quantile responses of log per capita GDP to crime shocks. Since the variance decompositions point to a 
more prominent role for the idiosyncratic state-specific crime shocks, we focus here on the responses to 
these idiosyncratic crime shocks. Thus, for example, Figures 6a and 6b show the quantile responses of state 
GDP to state-specific crime shocks based on two different methods for chaining together the GDP segments. 
While there are small quantitative differences, the shape of the response, and even the overall magnitudes 
are remarkably similar. For example, we see that the point estimate for the median response among states is 
initially slightly negative and eventually moves to approximately -0.005. The twenty-fifth percent quantile 
starts out at -0.004 and continues to drop to around -0.16 by five years after the shock. To translate this into 
economic terms, this implies that for at least a quarter of the Mexican states, a ceteris paribus shock to 
crime reduces real per capita GDP by 1.6 percent per year after a period of five years following the shock.  
 
As discussed in section III B, to understand the magnitude of the shocks themselves, one can scale them by 
the units associated with any of the response variables, as depicted in the appendix figure 10. Thus for 
example, since the median state homicide rate increases by 0.2 percent in the initial period in response to the 
crime shock, one can say that a crime shock that induces an initial 0.2 percent increase in homicides causes 
a 0.5 percent decrease in GDP for the median state. Notice that this does not imply that a change in 
homicides causes GDP to move by this amount. Indeed, if the cause of the movement in homicides is due to 
one of our other shocks, such as an aggregate supply shock or an aggregate demand shock, then the 
multiplier between homicides and GDP will be very different. Finally, notice that one need not scale the 
crime shock by homicides. For example, since the median state accumulated FDI decreases by 0.1 percent 
by the fifth year following the crime shock, one could just as well describe these results by saying that a 
crime shock which decreases accumulated FDI by 0.1 percent over a five-year period for the median state 
causes a 0.5 percent decrease in GDP for the median state. It should be clear from this discussion that crime 
shocks are not being measured nor proxied by homicide rates. Rather, homicide rates, in conjunction with 
the other variables, assist in identifying crime shocks based on the structural VAR identification scheme. 
We elaborate more on the interpretation of these results later, as well as the confidence bands associated 
with these estimates.   
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First, we continue to examine the qualitative robustness of the results. For example, in Figures 6c and 6d, 
we see a similar comparison of results for the two GDP methods when we use a three variable specification 
for the VAR that excludes log per capita international net in-migration. Since we use similar identifying 
restrictions for the remaining variables, the interpretation of the shocks may be slightly altered for these 
relative to the four variable specification. In particular, some migration shocks are now potentially lumped 
into what we call the crime shock, while only AS and AD shocks are controlled for in the other shocks. 
Accordingly, the impulse responses change quantitatively somewhat relative to the four variable 
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specification. However, they are still remarkably similar in pattern to the four variable specification, and the 
results for the two GDP measures are again remarkably similar. Similarly, we also examined a streamlined 
two variable system, with just log per capita homicides and log per capita GDP. Under this specification, we 
no longer control for AS and AD shocks separately, but rather control for a single economic activity shock 
that encompasses both AS and AD. Again, there are small quantitative differences, but the basic pattern 
remains with a clearly heterogeneous response of GDP to the crime shocks, with again remarkable similarity 
among the two GDP measures.   
 
The two variable system also affords us another useful opportunity relative to the three and four variable 
systems. Specifically, since the number of degrees of freedom required to estimate the lag structure for a 
two variable VAR system is considerably less than for a three or four variable VAR system, for the two 
variable system we are able to examine shorter spans of time. Thus, we take the opportunity to examine the 
impulse responses when we restrict the sample to 2003 to 2012. We choose this period for three reasons, 
namely (i) since the break in the base period for the original data occurs in 2003, it allows us a robustness 
check to confirm that chaining the GDP measures together across the two different periods does not alter our 
results; (ii) using 2003 as the sample break splits our sample into exactly two equal segments of 10 years; 
and (iii) we are particularly interested in the later period and take the opportunity to confirm that our general 
results are likely representative not only of the entire period, 1993–2012, but also of the more recent period, 
2003-2012. Finally, to check our chaining methods, we also ran each of the full sample VAR specifications 
with a dummy break for the pre- and post-2003 segments and confirmed that the results are not affected by 
the use of a dummy for the two periods.27 
 
Next, we examine in greater detail the various impulse responses that are of primary interest, for which we 
use the more general four variable VAR specification with our RGDP-2 data. Specifically, in Figure 7, we 
look in greater detail at the impulse responses of each of the variables to the state-specific crime shocks, as 
well as the response of crime to each of our other three shocks. In each case, we also report the bootstrapped 
90 percent confidence bands based on 5,000 bootstrap draws to confirm that the heterogeneous spread in the 
individual state responses is statistically significant. Thus, for example in Figure 7b, we see the responses of 
state-level log per capita GDP to state-specific crime shocks. This time, however, we have also included the 
90 percent confidence bands around both the upper and lower quantile responses. As we can see, these are 
both significantly different than zero. Thus, we can say with 90 percent confidence, equivalent to statistical 
significance at the 10 percent level or better that for at least a quarter of the states log per capita GDP 
decreases in response to crime shocks, while for at least a quarter of the states log per capita GDP increases. 
Furthermore, for the 25 percent or more states where log per capita GDP falls in response to a crime shock, 
we can say with 90 percent confidence that annual GDP falls by at least half a percentage point, and that this 
decrease appears to be permanent. On the other hand, for at least 25 percent of the states, we can say with 90 
percent confidence that GDP actually rises by a small amount, though we cannot say that it is necessarily 
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 Additionally, we also performed a robustness check by including time dummies for the financial crisis. Specifically, 
we included dummies for the years 2008 and 2009. We found that the result for one of the impulse responses was 
affected qualitatively. Specifically, the response of homicides to migration shocks became more mixed. However, for 
all of the other impulse responses, including the ones that we report and focus on in the paper, the inclusion of the 
dummies for the financial crisis had only a relatively minor numerical effect on the results. 
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greater than around a fifth of a percent of GDP.28 Our subsequent second stage analysis investigates for 
which types of states we can expect the response to be positive versus negative.   
 
First, we discuss the other key impulse responses. For example it is interesting to see that there are other 
statistically significant spreads in the individual state responses to the various shocks. For example, when 
we look at Figure 7c, we see that the point estimates for the state median of the cumulative response of FDI 
to crime shocks is slightly negative as indicated by the red line. The blue band illustrates that there is a 90 
percent confidence band that is significantly below zero for at least 25 percent of the states. For these states, 
by the time of the fifth year following the shock, cumulative FDI has decrease by somewhere between one 
percent and six percent. At the same time, the green band indicates that for at least 25 percent of the states’ 
FDI actually increases following a crime shock. In the second stage analysis, we investigate which state 
characteristics are associated with this pattern of responses of FDI to crime shocks. 
 
The prevailing pattern in all of the impulse responses depicted in Figure 7 is that regardless of whether the 
state median is above or below zero, there is in each case a group of states whose responses are either 
positive or negative with statistical significance at the 10 percent level or better (i.e., the 90 percent 
confidence band is entirely above or below the zero line). This is true for the response of migration to crime 
shocks as well as the response of homicides to each of the structural shocks. This is an important feature of 
the complexity of the relationship between crime and economic activity in Mexico. The relationship is by no 
means uniform, and there are differences in the patterns of responses that are statistically significant with a 
relatively high level of confidence. 
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 By contrast, the median state level responses to typical common shocks originating at the national and international 
level during the sample period appear to be smaller in magnitude with the most negatively affected quantile of states 
experiencing around a one-third percent decrease in its per capita GDPs, and the median state experiencing around a 
one-quarter percent decrease in its per capita GDP. In addition to computing the median state response, we also 
computed the implied aggregate national GDP response to a similar shock, which comes to roughly one-quarter percent 
of national GDP for a period of up to two years, decreasing in the third year, and eventually dissipating by the fourth 
year. It is also useful to bear in mind that the magnitude of the shocks can vary over the sample so that depending on 
the particular shock realization, the responses will be accordingly scaled up or down. In short, while national and 
international shocks impact both the state and national economy, it is the aggregation of the state-level responses to 
state-level crime shocks that has the bigger overall effect on the national economy. 
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Next we discuss the second stage analysis in which we look for characteristics of the state that are associated 
with the heterogeneous responses among the different states. For example, what characteristics of the state 
are associated with a positive or negative response of log per capita GDP to a crime shock? Similarly, what 
characteristics of the state are associated with larger or smaller changes in log per capita accumulated FDI in 
response to a similar crime shock? To investigate this, one might consider computing correlations, or even 
simple linear regressions between the response estimates for each of the 32 states and measured 
characteristics of each of the states. However, the problem with this approach is that it treats the impulse 
responses as raw data and does not adequately account for the uncertainty associated with the fact that state-
level impulse responses are themselves estimated. To address this, we instead use a bootstrapped estimator 
for the regression correlation between the state-specific responses and the measured state characteristics. 
Specifically, the bootstrapped estimator uses the same bootstrapped sampling distribution that was used to 
compute the confidence bands for the impulse responses and uses this to resample the regression correlation. 
Thus, for each of the 5,000 bootstrap draws, we compute 5,000 impulse responses, which we regress 5,000 
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times on the state characteristic measures. The 5,000 slope estimates give us a sample distribution for the 
bootstrapped regression correlation estimator. The tails of this distribution give us the 90 percent confidence 
bands for the regression correlation estimator and allow us to test the significance of the relationship in a 
way that accounts for the underlying uncertainty associated with the estimated impulse responses. 
 
The state-specific characteristics that we consider are described in section IV and include average schooling 
years, unemployment rates, bank deposits, marginalization indices, perceptions of public security, 
government spending on security, and a measure of the importance of economic informality. In addition to 
these, we also investigate state characteristics associated with the concentration of different economic 
sectors as a percentage of state GDP, the concentration of the sectors to which FDI flows, as well as the 
various other crime measurements and migration measurements previously discussed. Whenever we have 
multiple observations over time for any of these variables for a given state, we use the sample average for 
that state. Whenever the measures are economic quantities, we use them in log per capita form. 
 
A number of different characteristics appear to be statistically significant under certain scenarios. However, 
with so many characteristics and so many different impulse response configurations, we must take care not 
to inadvertently data mine the results. For example, at a five percent significance level, with so many 
characteristics and responses, we expect some significant responses to appear randomly and spuriously for 
certain specifications. Instead, we focus here only on the results that appear consistently significant for all of 
the various specifications. Among these, two stand out as particularly robust. The first is the relationship 
between the response of GDP to crime shocks and the percentage of GDP devoted to construction.29 
Figure 8a shows a scatterplot for this relationship. Specifically, the vertical axis depicts the percentage of 
state GDP devoted to construction. On the horizontal axis, we represent the response of log per capita GDP 
in the second year following the crime shock. Since the crime shock can have differing effects on homicides 
in different states as evidenced by the impulse responses in Figure 10, we also scaled this response by the 
magnitude of the first period homicide response to the crime shock. Thus, the horizontal axis can be 
interpreted as the percentage change in per capita GDP in the second year following a crime shock scaled by 
the percentage change in homicides caused by the same crime shock in the period in which the shock 
occurred. The positive association in the scatterplot implies that for states in which construction is more 
prominent, a crime shock is more likely to have a positive (or less negative) effect on overall state-level 
GDP.3031 
                                                     
29
 For a detailed description of what economic activities are included in the construction GDP, please see Sistema de 
Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico, Cuentas de Corto Plazo y Regionales: Fuentes y Metodologias (2013a), page 219. 
Construction GDP includes classifications from number 2361 to number 2389. 
30 Various reports produced by the FATF and GAFISUD have made references to the possibility that the real estate 
sector may be one of the many vehicles used by criminal organizations to launder money. Emerging markets seem to 
be more vulnerable to misuse of the real estate sector. The worldwide market growth of real estate-backed securities 
and the development of property investment funds have meant that the range of options for real estate investments has 
also grown. Emerging markets in particular can offer attractive returns at low prices with considerable room for 
growth. See FATF (2007) and GAFISUD (2010, 2012), FATF-GAFI (2008, 2014) and Unger (2006). As described in 
FATF-GAFI (2008, p. 316-318), “No AML/CFT regulations and supervisory framework exist for any category of 
Designated Non-Financial Business Professions (DNFBPs)except trust services which are designated financial 
institutions.” In Mexico, applicable DNFBPs include real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, lawyers, 
(continued…) 
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The bootstrap estimator for this relationship indicates that the bootstrapped median estimator for the slope is 
1.091 for the GDP-1 based VAR and 0.924 for the GDP-2 based VAR. The bootstrapped ninety-fifth 
percentile value for the GDP-1 based VAR is 2.065, and the fifth percentile value for the same is 0.112. 
Thus, very conservatively, taking into account all of the uncertainty associated with first stage VAR 
analysis, we can say that we have greater than 90 percent confidence that the relationship is positive and 
statistically significant. The values for the GDP-2 based VAR are similar, though with not quite as tight a 
confidence band, with the ninety-fifth percentile value at 1.944 and only the tenth percentile value in the 
positive range, also at 0.112. 
 
The other state characteristic that stands out as robustly significant in many different scenarios is the sense 
of public security measure, and in particular in regard to the responsiveness of FDI to crime shocks. 
Accordingly, in Figure 8b, we present a scatterplot of the relationship between the second period response of 
FDI to a crime shock, again scaled by the effect that the crime shock has on homicides, and the 
corresponding measure of the sense of public security in the state. Here the positive association implies that 
the greater the sense of security, the more likely the per capita accumulated FDI response is to be less 
negative to a crime shock. Conversely, the higher the sense of insecurity, the more likely it is that a crime 
shock will induce a larger cumulative decrease in FDI. 
 
The bootstrapped median estimator for the slope is 0.006 for the GDP-1 based VAR and 0.005 for the GDP-
2 based VAR. The bootstrapped ninety-fifth percentile values for the two are both 0.01, and the fifth 
bootstrapped fifth percentile values are 0.002 and 0.001 respectively. Thus, in both cases we can say 
conservatively that, after taking into account all of the uncertainty associated with first stage VAR analysis, 
we are 90 percent confident in both cases that the relationship is statistically significant and positive. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
notaries, and other independent legal professionals and accountants, and company services providers. FATF-GAFI 
(2008, footnote p.9). In this context, at the end of 2012, on the basis of the Bill for a Federal Law for the Prevention 
and Identification of Transactions with Criminal Proceeds, Mexico forbade cash payments of more than a half million 
pesos ($38,750) for real estate transactions. 
31
 As a robustness check, we examined whether the inclusion of dummies for the states with major international 
seaports or with borders to the U.S. made a difference for our second stage analysis associated with Figure 8.  For the 
relationship between the GDP response to crime shocks and the prevalence of construction, the relationship became 
slightly more significant with the inclusion of the dummies (the raw unbootrstapped t-statistic went from 1.837 to 
1.891).  For the relationship between the FDI response to crime shocks and the sense of public security, the relationship 
was virtually unchanged (the raw unbootstrapped t-statistic went from 2.096 to 2.094).    
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VI.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have used a panel structural VAR approach to study the dynamic relationship between 
crime and economic activity, including FDI flows and international migration flows at the state level in 
Mexico from 1993–2012. We find that these relationships are both highly inter-related and also potentially 
very diverse among the different states of Mexico. On the whole, crime is shown to be a relevant factor of 
the economies of many of the states and to have an impact on the overall economic activity at the state level. 
However, we find that the relationships between crime and economic activity at the state level are not as 
simple as one might have thought, and are instead fairly nuanced. 
 
In general, the overall picture that emerges from our analysis is that crime has been intertwined with other 
forms of economic activity in the states of Mexico from 1993-2012, including international factor flows. 
However, the relationships are complex and by no means uniform across the country. As with any important 
feature of an economy, a better understanding of the relationships at the aggregate economic level would be 
useful for the purposes of strengthening the policy response to crime and increasing potential economic 
growth. 
Figure 8. Mexico: Response Patterns
Source: INEGI,  Mexico'sSecretary of Economy, ENSI, ENVIPE, and authors' calculations
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In particular, the economic responses to crime are quite different among the states, as is the relative 
importance of crime for the economies of the various states of Mexico, with different quantiles of states 
experiencing different variations in GDP, FDI, and migration flows in response to crime shocks. To reiterate 
some of our quantitative results, we find that for the median state, a typical state-specific crime shock 
induces a roughly one-half percent temporary decrease in per capita GDP which persists up to two years 
after the shock before gradually dissipating after the third year. However, the median state responses 
obscure the fact that for some states the magnitude of the response is much greater. For example, for the 
most negatively affected quantile of states, we can say with 90 percent confidence that a typical crime shock 
induces at least one-half percent decrease in GDP that is permanent and does not dissipate. Furthermore, we 
find that the factor flow dynamics associated with these crime shocks, for both international migration and 
FDI, are by no means uniform across states, with a substantial number of states experiences factor flows in 
opposing directions.  
 
Consistent with other findings in the literature, our study also shows that the percentage of GDP devoted to 
construction in a particular state is associated with the size and magnitude of the economic response to 
crime, as is also the overall sense of public security at the state level as measured by survey data. Finally, it 
is worth noting that our sample covers the period from 1993 through 2012, and therein does not account for 
the reforms that have occurred in the period since then. Furthermore, our analysis is primarily intended to 
focus on the state level. 
 
A few of the policy relevant implications of our analysis are fairly straightforward.  For example, one of the 
more robust findings in our second stage analysis of the patterns of responses among the states to crime 
shocks is that the overall sense of security on the part of the public as reflected in survey responses appears 
to be important. Systematically, when the sense of security is higher, the impact of an equal-sized crime 
shock has a less negative impact on overall economic activity at the state level and in particular on FDI 
flows. This points to the potential importance of the perception and public confidence in the quality of 
institutions which provide for public security. Mexico has already put forward an ambitious structural 
reform agenda, including initiatives improving the rule of law. Judicial reform at the federal level in Mexico 
was approved by Congress in 2008, and it is expected that this reform will be in place in all states by 2016. 
It will be interesting to see whether these judicial reforms contribute to an improvement in the sense of 
overall security and therein help to mitigate the impact of crime on overall economic activity at the state 
level. 
 
Finally, in light of the economic aspect of crime and the degree to which we have shown how crime and 
economic activities have been interwined at the state level, both in response to local idiosyncratic as well as 
national and international common shocks, it will be interesting to see the extent to which current efforts 
toward a further strengthening of the AML/CFT regime, particularly in areas of high ML/TF related risks, 
might also help to further improve future potential economic growth prospects for Mexico.    
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VIII.   TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR THE CHAIN LINKING OF TWO REAL GDP SERIES IN DIFFERENT 
BASE YEARS 
Mexico has rebased the real GDP at the national and state levels in 1993, 2003, and 2008. In addition, 
Mexico has implemented new national accounts methodology in 2008. To compare the real GDPs with 
different bases and different accounting systems, we first need to chain link them.32 Mexico has real and 
nominal data, implicit prices and volumes for GDP sectors, and totals for years 1993–2006 using the 1993 
base year and 1993 accounting system 33 for all the Mexican states. It also has the same data for years 2003–
2012 using the 2008 base year and the 2008 accounting system for all the states. Although the 2008 
accounting system contains more subsectors than the 1993 accounting system, both accounting systems 
have three sectors in common: primarias (Sector 1), secundarias (Sector 2), and terciarias (Sector 3). Note 
that 2003-2006 are the overlapping years for both base years and both accounting systems. 
 
Real GDP Estimate by Estimating Sectors34 
 
For t=1993,...,2006, let  )(93 tQ
i
  be the real value of sector i at year t for each Mexican State, using the 1993 
accounting system and the base year 1993. Also let )(93 tP
i
 be the implicit price of sector i at year t, using 
base year 1993 and the 1993 accounting system. Note that 100)1993(93 
iP  for all sectors i since the base 
year is 1993. 
 
Note that )(93 tQ
i
 is the i-th sector component of the real GDP:  
 
RGDP )()1993(93 t =

3
1
93 )(
i
i tQ ,    t=1993,...,2006, 
 
where the superscript denotes the 1993 accounting system and the subscript denotes the base year. No 
sectorial price appears in the above formula. 
 
Now the nominal GDP using the 1993 accounting system and base year 1993 is 
 
NGDP )()1993(93 t =
100
1
),()( 93
3
1
93 tPtQ
i
i
i

    t=1993,...,2006. 
 
                                                     
32
 Actually, there are three base years for Mexican national accounts, 1993, 2003, and 2008. However, base year 2003 
and 2008 are comparable according to the authorities.  
33
 (S INEGI BIB(2014)) SNM(2006, 2000)) 
34
 See approach followed by McLennan (1998) for chaining GDP series. 
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In this expression, 100/)()( 9393 tPtQ
ii
 is the i-th sector component in the NGDP and 100/)(93 tP
i
 is the i-th 
sector's relative price at year t with respect to that in year 1993. In a sense, the above equation relates 
sectoral RGDP to the aggregated NGDP: )(93 tQ
i
acts as quantity in calculating the aggregated volume 
NGDP and the relative price 100/)(93 tP
i
 as the corresponding price (ABS(1998, page 7)). 
 
Let us re-base the 1993-base NGDP to the 2003-base NGDP, using the same accounting system.  
We will use similar notations. As usual, 100)2003(03 
iP . Thus 
)2003(
)(100
)(
93
93
03 i
i
i
P
tP
tP   for t=1993,1994 ,..., 
2006.  Applying the Laspeyres method (ABS(1998, page 8)), the 2003-based NGDP for years 1993–2006 in 
the 1993 accounting system are 
 
(1)  NGDP )()1993(03 t =
100
1
,
)2003(
)(
)()()(
93
93
3
1
9303
3
1
93 i
i
i
ii
i
i
P
tP
tQtPtQ 

   t=1993,...,2006. 
The change in the rebasing is: replacing the relative price at year t over 1993 with the relative price at year t 
over 2003. The quantities remain the same when rebasing NGDP under the same accounting system.   
 
Again, let us re-base the 2008-based NGDP to the 2003-based NGDP for each state, using the same 2008 
accounting system. The formula is 
 
(2)  NGDP )()2008(03 t =
100
1
,
)2003(
)(
)()()(
08
08
3
1
0803
3
1
08 i
i
i
ii
i
i
P
tP
tQtPtQ 

    t=2003,…,2012 
 
We want to extend NGDP )()2008(03 t to the years t=2002,2001,...,1993. At this moment, we only use the data 
in the single common year 2003 to bridge the two accounting systems. 
 
Let t=2003 in both (1) and (2): 
 
NGDP
)2003()1993(03 = )2003(
3
1
93
i
iQ  
NGDP
)2003()2008(03 = )2003(*
)2003(
)2003(
)2003( 93
3
1 93
08
3
1
08
i
i
i
i
i
i Q
Q
Q
Q 

  
 
Define .
)2003(
)2003(
93
08
i
i
i
Q
Q
R   From the above comparison, a natural extension of NGDP )()2008(03 t  to the years 
1993–2002 is 
NGDP )(
)2008(
03 t =
100
1
)()( 03
3
1
93 tPtQR
i
i
i
i

,     t=1993,…,2002 
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Similarly to that in deriving (1), after re-basing from base year 2003 to base year 2008 under the same 2008 
accounting system, we have the NGDP using the 2008 base year and the 2008 account system, 
 
NGDP )()2008(08 t =
100
1
)()( 08
3
1
93 tPtQR
i
i
i
i

,     t=1993,…,2002 
 
and finally the real GDP with the 2008 base year and the 2008 accounting system is 
 
(3)   RGDP
(2008,1)
08 ( )t = )(
3
1
93 tQR
i
i
i

,     t=1993,…,2003.  
 
As we have four common years 2003–2006 in the two accounting systems, we can average the ratios of real 
sectorial values and define 
 
(4)   







)2006(
)2006(
)2005(
)2005(
)2004(
)2004(
)2003(
)2003(
4
1
93
08
93
08
93
08
93
08
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
R
 
 
Using the average ratios, the real GDP with 2008 base and 2008 accounting system is 
 
(5)   
3
(2008,2)
08 93
1
( ) ( )ii
i
RGDP t R Q t

 ,     t=1993, …, 2002. 
 
Thus, we have all RGDP data in the same 2008 base year and same 2008 accounting system. 
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Real GDP Estimates by Scaling of Aggregated Volumes 
 
Without knowing the sectorial data, one may mimic the derivation of (3) using the aggregated RGDP. 
In this simplified version, we let
(2008)
(03) 08
(1993)
93
(2003)
(2003)
RGDP
R
RGDP
 . Then (3) becomes 
(6)   
(2008,3) (03) (1993)
08 93( ) * ( ),      1993, ,2002.RGDP t R RGDP t t    
 
Again, to mimic (4), we define 
 
(2008) (2008) (2008) (2008)
(03 06)
08 08 08 08
(1993) (1993) (1993) (1993)
93 93 93 93
(2003) (2004) (2005) (2006)1
4 (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006)
RGDP RGDP RGDP RGDP
R
RGDP RGDP RGDP RGDP
  
    
   
 
And the corresponding of RGDP estimate is 
 
(7)  
(03 06)(2008,4) (1993)
08 93( ) * ( ),       1993,...,2002.RGDP t R RGDP t t

 
 
 
Real GDP Estimates by Gradually Adjusted Ratios 
 
Essentially, in the above scenarios (3),(5),(6), and (7), the scaling ratios are constant over time either 
in sectors in (3) and (5) or constant in the aggregated values in (6) and (7). This can mitigate (Correa 
et al (2002)). 
 
Ignoring the accounting system changes, let us consider the ratio of RGDP of 2003 in two base years 
08
03
93
(2003)
(2003)
RGDP
D
RGDP
  and assume that the ratio was the result of a geometric developed process 
over 10 years from 1993 to 2003. Then each year’s rebasing ratio is 
1/10D  and thus for years 
t=1993,1994,…,2002, the 2008-based RGDP has the estimation 
 
(8) 
(2008,5) ( 1993)/10 (1993)
08 03 93( ) * ( ),       1993,...,2002.
tRGDP t D RGDP t t 
 
 
If we capitalize on all four common years, (8) becomes 
 
(9)  
( 1993)/10 ( 1993)/11 ( 1993)/12 ( 1993)/13
(2008,6) (1993)03 04 05 06
08 93( ) * ( )
4
t t t tD D D D
RGDP t RGDP t
     

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RGDP RGDP RGDP
  
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To account for the GDP accounting changes, we use a log linear function to fit the ratios tD  as 
tt tcD  log in which the constant c cares for the accounting change effects. We can use the 
ratios tD  at t=2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 to estimate the coefficients cˆ  and .ˆ  Then let tDˆ  such 
that tcDt ˆˆ
ˆlog   for t=1993,…, 2002. Finally, the formula which combines the accounting 
change and the geometrically rebasing is 
 
(10)   
002.1993,...,2     t),(*ˆ)( )1993(93
)7,2008(
08  tRGDPDtRGDP t  
  
Robustness checks 
 
In generating the reported empirical results, we have used two sets of linked real GDP series. The so-
called GDP Approach 1 is linked by the formula (6) and the GDP Approach 2 series is linked by the 
formula (5). However, our experiment with other scenarios shows that our results are quite robust, 
regardless of the choice of approach to link the GDP series.  
 
To test the robustness of our findings, we have also used all the above real aggregated GDP 
approaches for each Mexican state in (3), (5)–(9) Our results are very similar under these different 
scenarios. Please see plots of different approaches for linking two real GDP series for Mexican states 
in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Approaches for Linking Real GDP Series for Mexican States
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Table 1. GDP Sectors for years 1993 and 2008 
 
  
 
Source: INEGI 2013b and 2013c 
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Figure 10. State Level Quantiles for Impulse Responses to Idiosyncratic and Common Shocks
                          (Four variable system, 1993-2012, GDP approach 2)
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Figure 11. State Level Quantiles for Variance Decompositions for Idiosyncratic and Common Shocks
                                       (Four variable system, 1993-2012, GDP approach 2)
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Table 2. Names of Mexican States 
 
State Name Abbreviation 
Aguascalientes Agu 
Baja California Baj 
Baja California Sur Bas 
Campeche Cam 
Chiapas Chia 
Chihuahua Chih 
Coahuila Coa 
Colima Col 
Distrito Federal DF 
Durango Dur 
Estado de México EM 
Guanajuato Gua 
Guerrero Gue 
Hidalgo Hid 
Jalisco Jal 
Michoacán Mic 
Morelos Mor 
Nayarit Nay 
Nuevo León NL 
Oaxaca Oax 
Puebla Pue 
Querétaro Que 
Quintana Roo Qui 
San Luis Potosí San 
Sinaloa Sin 
Sonora Son 
Tabasco Tab 
Tamaulipas Tam 
Tlaxcala Tla 
Veracruz Ver 
Yucatán Yuc 
Zacatecas Zac 
National Nat 
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Table 3. Data Sources 
Variables Range Source 
Aggregated Real GDP   
 
 
Base year=1993 1993-2006 INEGI 
 
Base year=2008 2003-2012 INEGI 
 
Rebasing to base=2008 1993-2012 See Appendix  
 
   
 
   
Homicide Rate 
  
 
Intentional homicide incidences by 
death 
1993-2012 INEGI 
 
homicide statistics by law 
enforcement 
1997-2012 SESNSP 
 
   
 
  
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
 
 
Aggregated nominal FDI (in US$) 1999-2012 
Secretaria de 
Economia (2014) 
 
US CPI 1993-2012 FRED database 
 
   
 
   
Population and Migration 
  
 
Population observation and 
estimation 
1990-2010 CONAPO  
 
Population forecast 2011-2030 CONAPO  
 
International Net In-migration 2003-2012 CONAPO  
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Schooling  
1990, 1995, 
2000, 2005, 
2006, 2008-2011 
INEGI 
Unemployment  2003-2012 INEGI 
Marginalization  
1990, 1995, 
2000, 2005, 
2010 
CONAPO 
Government spending  Mora (2009)  
Bank Deposits 2000-2010 
National Banking 
and Securities 
Commission of 
Mexico  
Informality  
2005,2007,2009-
2011 
INEGI and Ministry 
of Labour and Social 
Welfare  
Perception of public 
security 
2005, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 
2012 
ENSI and ENVIPE 
Disaggregated Real FDI 
by Sectors 
1999-2012 
Secretaria de 
Economia (2014) 
Disaggegatd Real GDP 
by Sectors 
2003-2012 INEGI (2014) 
SESNSP 
Crimes against Health 
 
SESNSP/CONAPO 
Federal Law against 
Organized Crime  
SESNSP/CONAPO 
 
Agravated Assault 
(Violent Crime)  
SESNSP/CONAPO 
Robbery (Violent 
Crime)  
SESNSP/CONAPO 
Extorsion 
 
SESNSP/CONAPO 
Kidnapping 
 
SESNSP/CONAPO 
 
Notes: Most data is used in log per capita form. For the first stage VAR estimation, Homicides, GDP 
and Net In-migration were used in log per capita growth rates, and the subsequent impulse responses 
were accumulated. These transformations are discussed in the text of the paper. 
